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MUNICIPAL TORTS:

THE RULE IS LIABILITY-THE EXCEP-

IMMUNITY-Enghauser Manufacturing Co. v. Eriksson
Engineering Ltd., 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 451 N.E.2d 228 (1983).
TION IS

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1982, the Ohio Supreme Court signaled its intention to eliminate the traditional sovereign immunity doctrine which had long protected Ohio's municipal corporations from tort liability.1 It was not until Enghauser Manufacturing Co. v. Eriksson Engineering Ltd.,'
however, that the court made it unmistakably clear that municipalities
would no longer be shielded by immunity. In so doing, the court joined
the majority of states3 which have refused to blindly adhere to the common-law immunity doctrine. Boldly confronting the problem of stare
decisis, the court overruled a long line of prior decisions to hold that
"so far as municipal governmental responsibility for torts is concerned,
the rule is liability-the exception is immunity.""
This note will briefly trace the development of the sovereign immunity doctrine and examine the standard adopted by the Enghauser
court. It will also discuss the ramifications of Enghauserand the necessity of a comprehensive legislative response to the abrogation of sovereign immunity.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Enghauser Manufacturing Company of Lebanon, Ohio sued that
city in 1978,1 charging that the city had "negligently planned,
designed, and constructed a new bridge and roadway which proximately resulted in the flooding of [Enghauser's] abutting industrial
property."'6 A jury trial commenced in August, 1978, and resulted in a

1. See Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc., 2 Ohio St. 3d 26, 442 N.E.2d 749 (1982). See
also infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
2. 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 451 N.E.2d 228 (1983).
3. For a listing of jurisdictions which have limited sovereign immunity by judicial decision,
see Haas v. Hayslip, 51 Ohio St. 2d 135, 141 n.6, 364 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 n.6 (1977) (Brown, J.,
dissenting). For a listing of jurisdictions which will not confer immunity in the absence of a statute granting immunity, see 18 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

§

53.02,

at 108 n.4 (3d ed. 1977 & Supp. 1982).
4. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 33, 451 N.E.2d at 230. Identical language can be found in Holytz v.
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (1962).
5. Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Eng'g, Ltd., 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 451 N.E.2d 228 (1983)
(Eriksson Engineering, Ltd-found not liable-and Carl Eriksson-dismissed as a party-were
also named as defendants).
6. Id. at 32, 451 N.E.2d at 229.
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$91,000 judgment against the city.7 Thereafter, acting on the city's motion, the trial court ordered that the verdict and judgment entry be set
aside and that final judgment be entered for the city." The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that the erection of the bridge was governmental in nature and hence the city was protected by sovereign

immunity. 9

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of ap-

peals, stating that "immunity from tort liability heretofore judicially
conferred upon local governmental units is hereby abrogated." 10 Consequently, the jury verdict awarding damages to Enghauser Manufacturing Company was reinstated.11
III.

BACKGROUND

The doctrine of sovereign immunity developed from the English
notion that the "king can do no wrong."12 As applied in the United
States, the doctrine "expanded to the point where the historical sovereignty of kings was relied upon to support a protective prerogative for
municipalities.""3 Thus, the state and its subdivisions were permitted to
14
escape liability for tortious acts.
Because of the rule's harsh effect, courts began to assign a dual
character to municipal corporations.15 A municipality was not held liable for its tortious acts if found to be exercising a "governmental function" at the time of the act. 6 However, if it was found that the municipality was exercising a "proprietary function," its liability was
7. Id. at 32, 451 N.E.2d at 229-30.
8. Id. at 32, 451 N.E.2d at 230. However, a finding of nuisance against the city was not set
aside. Id.
9. Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. City of Lebanon, No. 474, slip op. at 8 (Ohio 12th Dist. Ct. App.
Mar. 31, 1982) (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review). See also infra notes 15-17
and accompanying text.
10. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 32-33, 451 N.E.2d at 230.
11. Id. at 36, 451 N.E.2d at 233. Enghauser was also awarded $34,020 as interest from the
date of the original judgment entry. Western Star, Aug. 10, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
12. 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 53.02, at 104. It has also been suggested that the
doctrine is based on the theory that "there can be no legal right against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends." Haas v. Hayslip, 51 Ohio St. 2d 135, 140 n.2, 364 N.E.2d
1376, 1379 n.2 (1977) (quoting Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)).
13. 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 53.02, at 104 (quoting Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis.
2d 26, 30, 115 N.W.2d 618, 620 (1962)).
14. 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 53.02, at 104.
15.

Id.

16. Id. at 104-05. As to the rationale for granting immunity for governmental functions,
Chief Justice Marshall stated, "The nonliability for governmental functions is placed upon the
ground that the state is sovereign, that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent, and that
the municipality is the mere agent of the state and therefore cannot be sued unless the state gives
its consent by legislation." City of Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 283, 156 N.E. 210, 211
(1927).
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determined under the same tests applied to private persons and
corporations.'
In 1854, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted this governmental/proprietary distinction to decide questions of municipal tort liability.18 But
the distinction was to cause absurd results in many of the cases which
followed.1 9 Thus, a gamut of services-ranging from hospital operation
to garbage collection-have at different times been classified as both

governmental and proprietary.

0

Although there had been many signs of discontent with the sover-

eign immunity doctrine among the justices of the Ohio Supreme
Court,2 ' the first major step in abrogating the doctrine came with the
1982 Haverlack decision. 2 In Haverlack, the court observed that the
governmental/proprietary distinction had caused confusion and unpredictability in the law.2 The court held that a municipal corporation,
unless immune by statute, would be liable for negligence in the per-

25
formance of its acts.2 Due to the wording of the syllabus of the court

however, there was some confusion as to whether the Haverlack decision might be fact-specific and limited to the negligent operation of a

sewage plant. 6 Therefore, it was not until Enghauser that the court
clearly articulated its intention for the abrogation of sovereign immu-

17. 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 53.02, at 105. Proprietary functions were defined as
those "in pursuit of private and corporate duties, for the particular benefit of the corporation and
its inhabitants, as distinguished from those things in which the whole state has an interest."
Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. at 284, 156 N.E. at 211.
18. See City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80, 99-100 (1854).
19. It has been said that "the nebulous distinction between governmental and proprietary
functions is about as stable as a gull on a wave and that the 'rules which courts have sought to
establish in solving this problem are as logical as those governing French irregular verbs.' " Comment, Recent Important Tort Cases against Governmental Units, 32 AM. TRIAL LAW. L.J. 284,
289 (1968) (quoting Weeks v. City of Newark, 62 N.J. Super. 166, 178, 162 A.2d 314, 321 (App.
Div. 1960), affid, 34 N.J. 250, 168 A.2d 11 (1961)).
20. For a listing of Ohio cases which demonstrate the inconsistencies which have plagued
the courts in their attempts to apply the governmental/proprietary distinction, see Hack v. City of
Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 400 n.2, 189 N.E.2d 857, 865 n.2 (1963) (Gibson, J., concurring).
21. See id. at 397, 189 N.E.2d at 868 (Gibson, J., concurring); Haas, 51 Ohio St. 2d at
145, 364 N.E.2d at 1382 (Brown, J., dissenting); Eversole v. City of Columbus, 169 Ohio St. 205,
208, 158 N.E.2d 515, 518 (1959).
22. Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc., 2 Ohio St. 3d 26, 442 N.E.2d 749 (1982).
23. Id. at 29, 442 N.E.2d at 752.
24. Id. at 30, 442 N.E.2d at 752.
25. The syllabus reads, "The defense of sovereign immunity is not available, in the absence
of a statute providing immunity, to a municipal corporation in an action for damages alleged to be
caused by the negligent operation of a sewage treatment plant." Id. at 26, 442 N.E.2d at 749
(emphasis added).
26. See Gotherman, Ohio Supreme Court Abolishes Sovereign Immunity of Ohio's Municipalities, OHIO CITIES & VILLAGES, Mar. 1983, at 4, 4-5. Gotherman reasoned that the Haverlack
decision was not meant to be limited to the operation of sewage plants because it overruled the
Haas decision, which involved circumstances of a police shooting. Id.
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nity to have wide-sweeping significance.

IV.

ANALYSIS

A.

Judicial Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity

1.

The Need to Abolish the Doctrine

In Enghauser Manufacturing Co. v. Eriksson Engineering Ltd.,
Justice William B. Brown, writing for the majority, stated that since
the sovereign immunity doctrine had been judicially created, it could be
judicially abolished." He stressed that the court had not only the
power, but the duty to evaluate the doctrine "in light of reason, logic,
and the actions, functions and duties of a municipality in the twentieth
century."2 " The Enghauser court advanced two reasons for abolishing
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The first reason was that an individual should be afforded a legal remedy if he is injured due to the
negligence of agents of municipal corporations. 9 Wisely rejecting the
notion which originated in eighteenth century England that it is better
for an individual to sustain an injury than for the public to be inconvenienced,30 the court embraced the basic tort law concept thai liability
follows negligence.-" The second reason advanced by the court was that
the availability of insurance and other modern funding methods would
provide the revenue from which judgments could be paid.3 2 Brown
27. 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 33, 451 N.E.2d 228, 230 (1983). In dissenting opinions, Justice Brown
had previously taken the stance that the doctrine could be judicially abolished. See Haas v. Hayslip, 51 Ohio St. 2d 135, 142, 364 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 (1977) (Brown, J., dissenting); Thacker v.
Board of Trustees, 35 Ohio St. 2d 49, 67, 298 N.E.2d 542, 552 (1973). The same notion of
judicial abrogation has also been expressed by other Ohio justices. See Schenkolewski v. Cleveland
Metroparks Sys., 67 Ohio St. 2d 31, 35-36, 426 N.E.2d 784, 787 (1981); Sears v. City of Cincinnati, 31 Ohio St. 2d 157, 161-62, 285 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1972); Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio
St. 383, 396, 189 N.E.2d 857, 868 (1963) (Gibson, J.,concurring). Several other jurisdictions
have found judicial abrogation of the doctrine to be proper. See, e.g., Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17
Wis. 2d 26, 37, 115 N.W.2d 618, 623 (1962); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,
218, 359 P.2d 457, 461, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93 (1961).
28. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 33, 451 N.E.2d at 231.
29. Id. at 34, 451 N.E.2d at 231.
30. See Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (K.B. 1788).
31. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 34, 451 N.E.2d at 231. See also the Comment, supra note 19, wherein
the author stated:
[T]oday cities and states are active and virile creatures capable of inflicting great harm,
and their civil liability should be co-extensive. Even though a governmental entity does not
profit from its projects, the taxpaying public nevertheless does, and it is the taxpaying
public which should pay for governmental maladministration. If the city operates or maintains injury-inducing activities or conditions, the harm thus caused should be viewed as a
part of the normal and proper costs of public administration and not as a diversion of
public funds. The city is a far better loss-distributing agency than the innocent and injured
victim.
Id. at 288.
32. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 34, 451 N.E.2d at 231. But cf. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CiTrs, THE
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noted, without further elaboration, that there was no empirical data to
support the fear that governmental functions would necessarily be curtailed if municipalities were forced to pay judgments rendered against
them."
After suggesting reasons why sovereign immunity should be abolished, the court next had to tackle the difficult question of whether
more than a century of Ohio case law could properly be overruled.
2.

The Problem of Stare Decisis

Although it has been stated that the "sovereign immunity rule is
so firmly entrenched in Ohio jurisprudence that it is too much to hope
that the Ohio Supreme Court will overrule the multitude of cases that
has accumulated," 3 ' that is exactly what the court did in Enghauser.
The court, while conceding the importance of stare decisis as a means
to preserve the wisdom and morality of past ages, stressed that a rule
35
a
that has "outlived its usefulness" should be changed. Employing
6 Justice
opinion,
prior
a
in
used
had
he
memorable expression which
Brown wrote that when a judge-made rule of law no longer serves a
useful purpose, the court should not "perpetuate it until petrification." 37 Thus, the court correctly reasoned that retention of the sovereign immunity rule was not justified, even though a part of the common
law for hundreds of years.38
3.

Prospective versus Retroactive Abrogation
Although the court did not address the issue of whether the elimi-

NEW WORLD OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

4-6 (1978) (suggesting that municipalities may encounter

difficulty in attempting to obtain insurance coverage primarily because they have not been viewed
as good liability risks by insurance companies).
33. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 34, 451 N.E.2d at 231. Accord Note, Governmental Tort Immunity in
Massachusetts: The Present Need for Change and Prospects for the Future, 10 SUFFOLK U.L.
was rendered in
REV. 521, 533 (1976). Ironically, after the judgment against the city of Lebanon
Enghauser, Lebanon's city manager stated that one side effect of the $91,000 judgment would be
a reduction in the city's street improvement program. Western Star, Aug. 10, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
34. Comment, Ohio Sovereign Immunity: Long Lives the King, 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 75, 91

(1967).
35. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 34, 451 N.E.2d at 231.
36. Thacker, 35 Ohio St. 2d at 70, 298 N.E.2d at 554 (Brown, J., dissenting). In Thacker,
Justice Brown quoted Oliver Wendell Holmes to support his view that a rule should not persist
simply from "blind imitation of the past." Id. (quoting 0. W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920)).
37. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 34, 451 N.E.2d at 231. It is interesting to note that criticism of the
sovereign immunity doctrine has spurred the creation of several memorable expressions. Governmental immunity has been called "the most Gothic and granitic of all the immunities" which has
lingered, "like the festering foot of Philoctetes, despite its offensiveness to the sensibilities of passing jurists and generations." Comment, supra note 19, at 286-87.
38. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 34, 451 N.E.2d at 231.
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nation of sovereign immunity was to be prospective or retroactive,39
Justice Holmes, in dissent, strongly urged that if sovereign immunity
had to be abrogated, the abrogation should be prospective.4 0 He stated
that abolishing the doctrine retroactively "would deny municipalities
that have relied upon it the opportunity to make arrangements to meet
the new liability to which they are subject."' 41 They would face liability
without having had the chance to obtain insurance.42 In addition, Justice Holmes stressed that prospective abrogation would give the general
assembly an opportunity to act on the majority's decision for, in his
opinion, it is the legislature "which is best equipped to balance competing considerations of public policy." 4' 3
Surely, it would have been more logical to apply the Enghauser
decision prospectively." As Justice Holmes noted, a prospective application has been adopted by the overwhelming number of jurisdictions
which have chosen to abolish the doctrine.4 5 Nevertheless, cases decided after Enghauser have indicated that the decision to abrogate immunity is to be applied retroactively in Ohio. 46 Consequently, munici-

39. For a discussion of the constitutional aspects of the retroactive abrogation of sovereign
immunity, see Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory
Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REV. 163, 229-53 (1963). Professor Van Alstyne suggested that making
governmental tort liability retroactive to causes of action which accrued prior to legislative abrogation of sovereign immunity might survive constitutional challenges, while a retroactive elimination of tort liability might not. Id. at 229-34. He wrote:
Private persons, it must be borne in mind, are within the protection of constitutional limitations which do not apply to public entities, and hence may be in a position to challenge
impairments of their tort claims against public entities even though such entities may have
no reciprocal basis for challenging enlargements of their tort liabilities.
Id. at 234.
40. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 37, 451 N.E.2d at 233 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 37, 451 N.E.2d at 234.
44. Common sense demanded, however, that the decision be applied to the plaintiff, Enghauser Manufacturing Company. As the Supreme Court of New Hampshire indicated in its
decision to abrogate sovereign immunity, simply announcing the new rule without applying it in
the decision could result in the announcement being considered mere dictum-depriving the plaintiffs of any benefit they had earned from their efforts and expense. Merrill v. City of Manchester,
114 N.H. 722, 730-31, 332 A.2d 378, 384 (1974).
45. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 37, 451 N.E.2d at 234 (Holmes, J., dissenting). It should be observed,
though, that the California Supreme Court's decision to abrogate sovereign immunity in Muskopf
v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961), was made retroactive by statute. See 1963 CAL. STAT. § 45(a). For a discussion of the Muskopf decision, see infra
text accompanying notes 59-61.
46. See Carbone v. Overfield, 6 Ohio St. 3d 212, 451 N.E.2d 1229 (1983) (holding a board
of education liable for the negligence of its employees); Strohofer v. City of Cincinnati, 6 Ohio St.
3d 118, 451 N.E.2d 787 (1983) (holding municipality liable for the tortious design and placement
of traffic control devices); Dickerhoof v. City of Canton, 6 Ohio St. 3d 128, 451 N.E.2d 1193
(1983) (holding municipality liable for failing to keep the shoulder of a highway in repair and free
from nuisance).
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palities which may have been uninsured or underinsured may now be
held liable for torts which occurred at a time when they believed themselves to be shielded by immunity. Municipalities will not be faced with
liability in every case, however. The court carved some vital exceptions
out of the general rule of municipal tort liability.
B.

Guidelines to Liability

The Enghauser court specified three exceptions to the general rule
that a municipality will be liable for all harm which results from its
activities. First, the general rule of liability is to apply only to tort
claims. 7 Secondly, a municipality will not be subject to liability where
a statute provides immunity.48 Finally, immunity will be retained for
certain acts which go to the "essence of governing."' 9 Justice Brown
wrote that the "appropriate dividing line5" falls between those functions which rest on the exercise of judgment and discretion and represent planning and policy-making 51 and those functions which involve
the implementation and execution of such governmental policy or planning."' 52 By way of clarification, Justice Brown stated that municipalities will be immune from tort liability for those acts involving the exercise of a legislative function, judicial function, or executive or planning
function concerning the making of a basic policy decision." To qualify
for immunity, this policy decision should be one "characterized by the

47. Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Eng'g Ltd., 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 35, 451 N.E.2d 228, 232
(1983).
48. Id. For example, Ohio already has a statute which provides immunity to municipalities
for harm caused by police and fire department vehicular accidents occurring during emergency

runs.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 701.02 (Page 1976).

49. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 35, 451 N.E.2d at 232.
50. It is interesting to observe that in 1854, the court adopted a "dividing line" to mitigate
the harsh effect of the sovereign immunity rule on that harmed individual. See supra notes 15-18
and accompanying text. The present "dividing line," on the other hand, was adopted to mitigate
the harsh result on a municipality of holding it wholly liable for all its tortious conduct.
51. McQuillin explains the rationale for the "dividing line" chosen by Justice Brown:
Lawfully authorized planning by governmental bodies is said to have a unique character
deserving of special treatment as regards the extent to which it may give rise to tort liability, so that while it is proper and necessary to hold municipalities liable for injuries arising
out of the ordinary day-to-day operations of government, to accept a jury's verdict as to the
reasonableness and safety of a plan of governmental services and prefer it over the judgment of the governmental body which originally considered and passed on the matter
would be to obstruct normal governmental operations and to place in inexpert hands what
the governmental body has seen fit to entrust to experts.
18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 53.04a, at 123.
52. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 35, 451 N.E.2d at 232 (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions which
have recognized similar "dividing lines" are Arizona, Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Florida,
Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and
Wisconsin. 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 53.04a, at 125 nn.3-4.
53. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 36, 451 N.E.2d at 232.
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exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion." 5 ' However,
municipalities are to be governed by the same liability standards applicable to persons and private corporations for acts involving the carrying
out of previously established policies. 55
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes expressed concern that
the "dividing line" proposed by Justice Brown was vague and ambiguous.56 Although he was technically correct when he stated that "[little
practical guidance is given to bench and bar by the adoption of such a
nebulous standard, ' ' 57 it must be remembered that it would be impossible for the court to phrase a standard which would automatically provide a "dividing line" for every conceivable municipal activity in every
conceivable situation. However, by adopting the above standard, the
court has made it clear that immunity will no longer be afforded to
Ohio's municipalities merely on the premise that a municipal corporation, being an agent of the sovereign state, may not be sued without the
sovereign's consent. Instead, the new standard offers a rational basis for
immunity in certain situations. Allowing immunity for municipal functions which require a high degree of official judgment or discretion permits "the creative exercise of political discretion" without "the inhibiting influence of potential legal liability asserted with the advantage of
hindsight.""
It would be greatly beneficial if the Enghauserdecision sparks the
kind of legislative response in Ohio which the Muskopf 5 9 decision triggered in California. In Muskopf, the California Supreme Court judicially abrogated governmental immunity. Employing a standard much
like the one announced by Justice Brown in Enghauser, Justice Traynor in Muskopf stated that, although "when there is negligence, the
rule is liability,"6 0 exceptions would exist for government officials performing discretionary acts within the scope of their authority.",
After the Muskopf decision, the California Legislature enacted a
two-year moratorium in order to study the situation and pass comprehensive legislation.6" As a result, a detailed statute delineating areas of

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 38, 451 N.E.2d at 234.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 35, 451 N.E.2d at 232 (quoting Spencer v. General Hosp., 425 F.2d 479, 488
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (Wright, J., concurring)).
59. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1961).
60. Id. at 219, 359 P.2d at 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
61. Id. at 220, 359 P.2d at 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
62. See Corning Hosp. Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 488, 370 P.2d 325, 20 Cal. Rptr.
621 (1962); C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN, JR. & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 753
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immunity and liability was enacted. 3 Thus, in California, the court
and the legislature joined together in the effective abrogation of sovereign immunity-the court providing the general standard and the legislature providing the practical guidelines to make the standard workable. Professor Arvo Van Alstyne, who prepared a study for the
California Law Revision Commission during the moratorium period,
wrote:
It is entirely probable, in the long view, that the principal significance of
the Muskopf decision will prove to be its role as a stimulus to detailed
appraisal of the problem by the legislature, with consequent statutory
formulation of a new body of law to replace the chaotic and inconsistent64
rules (both legislatively and judicially formulated) previously in effect.
Because the California Legislature succeeded in making the basic
teachings of Muskopf workable, Justice Holmes in his Enghauser dissent was certainly correct when he stated that the court's decision cries
out for a legislative response.6 5
V.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY

A house bill has been introduced into the Ohio General Assembly,6 6 the stated purpose of which is "to restore the sovereign immunity
of political subdivisions and to specify areas of liability of political subdivisions. 67 Consistent with Enghauser, the bill would create a code
section to provide that, if the act which gives rise to liability occurs
while a municipality's employee is engaged in the performance of a
judicial, quasi-judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, quasi-legislative, policy-making or planning function, the municipality and employee would
be immune from liability."

(3d ed. 1977).
63. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1980).
64. Van Alstyne, supra note 39, at 163.
65. 6 Ohio St. 3d at 38, 451 N.E.2d at 234 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Brown would
no doubt agree, for in Thacker he called for the general assembly to "spell out the types of
governmental acts where immunity is provided in a logical scheme" in order to "remedy the inconsistencies and the lack of predictability that could result from the piecemeal abolition." Thacker v. Board of Trustees, 35 Ohio St. 2d 49, 78, 298 N.E.2d 542, 559 (1973) (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
66. H. 482, 115th Ohio General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1983) (introduced July 28, 1983).
67. Id. at 1.
68. Id. at 13. At least one section of the bill appears to have been drafted prior to the
Enghauser decision, for it attempts to define and list "governmental functions" which presumably
would confer immunity on municipalities. Id. at 10-12. This section is undoubtedly a response to
Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc., 2 Ohio St. 3d 26, 442 N.E.2d 749 (1982), because it refers to
governmental functions as "those activities and functions of political subdivisions determined to be
governmental functions pursuant to the principles of the common law of this state as of December
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The practical value of the bill lies in its attempt to set procedural
and monetary limits on claims against municipal corporations. A statute of limitations has been proposed which would specify the time period during which claims against municipalities could be filed.6 9 The
0
bill also seeks to eliminate prejudgment interest, punitive damages, 7
and damages for pain and suffering. 7 1 Moreover, except in wrongful
death actions, damages would be confined to specified dollar amounts
of liability per person and per occurrence.7 ' Finally, the bill proposes to
enact statutes by which municipalities would be able to protect themselves. These statutes would authorize municipalities to use public
funds to secure insurance and to engage in self-insurance or pooled insurance programs if they so desire.7 3 Municipalities would also be authorized to hire consultants and employees for the establishment and
operation of risk management programs. 4
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Enghauser Manufacturing Co. v. Eriksson Engineering Ltd.,
the Ohio Supreme Court made it clear that municipalities will no
longer be shielded from liability for their tortious acts based on the
antiquated notion that the "king can do no wrong." Instead, municipalities will be immune from liability only for planning functions which
involve the exercise of judgment and discretion, or in situations where
immunity is expressly conferred by statute.
Since the court has now set a rational standard for the application

14, 1982." Id. at 10. Haverlack was decided on Dec. 15, 1982. For a discussion of the Haverlack
decision, see supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 14. Proposed OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.05(B) reads, "A written claim with
respect to an injury to person, damage to property, or for death shall be presented to a political
subdivision within one hundred eighty days after the personal injury, property damage, or death
giving rise to the alleged cause of action occurred .
I..."
Id. (emphasis added).
70. In denying claimants punitive damages against municipal corporations, many courts
have reasoned that "while the public is benefited by the exaction of such damages against a malicious, willful or reckless wrongdoer, the benefit does not follow when the public itself is penalized
for the acts of its agents over which it is able to exercise but little direct control." 18 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 53.18a, at 161.
71. H. 482, 115th Ohio General Assembly, Reg. Sess. 16 (1983).
72. Id. at 17. The proposed ceiling for damages is $250,000 in favor of any one person and
$500,000 in the aggregate. Id. For limitations on damages which have been proposed in other
jurisdictions, see NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 32, at 20-49.
73. H. 482, 115th Ohio General Assembly, Reg. Sess. 19-20 (1983). See NATIONAL
LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 32, at 13-14 (wherein it is indicated that self-insurance or pooling
may be the only way for municipalities to obtain comprehensive liability insurance protection).
74. H. 482, 115th Ohio General Assembly, Reg. Sess. 19 (1983). One commentator has
aptly stated that "[plublic safety becomes a matter of real concern to the city fathers when the
city is liable for its torts: repair programs are stimulated in the areas of municipal activities where
liability attaches; safety education for both officers and the general public is likely to result."
Comment, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 437, 460 (1941).
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of sovereign immunity, the Ohio General Assembly, like the California
Legislature, must provide practical guidelines to make the standard
workable. Legislation should include statutes which confer immunity in
specific situations as well as statutes which set procedures for the filing
and disposition of claims, and set limits on amounts recoverable. House
Bill 482 proposes to accomplish some of these objectives.
The court's abrogation of sovereign immunity in Enghauser will
have the highly desirable effect of allowing harmed individuals to seek
redress against municipal corporations. Moreover, as municipalities
take a hard look at ways in which they can decrease their risks, employees who have consistently performed in a negligent manner will not
be retained. 5 This, too, will be in the public interest. Balanced against
the benefit to the public, however, is the cost to municipalities of having their liability expanded. Thus, necessary legislation conferring immunity in appropriate situations and setting limits on amounts recoverable will ensure that deserving individuals receive fair compensation for
their injuries and will allow municipal corporations to remain solvent.
Carol A. Lanyi

75.

See Gotherman, supra note 26, at 6.
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